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The experiencesof women who have been chargedwith welfarefraud
in the years following the passage of the 1996 PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act cast a shadow over
the claim that welfare reform has been an unequivocal success. This
article addresses this under-explored issue by considering theface
of welfarefraud in San Diego, Californiaafter the change to federal
welfare law. After a brief discussionof the socio-historicalcontext of
welfarefraud prosecution and a summary of the scholarlyfindings
related to welfare fraud post-PRWORA, the aiticle details a new
"poverty knowledge" about welfarefraud drawnfrom the experiences of women. This is followed by a discussion of how this knowledge
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has been used to help inspire the creation of a welfare fraud diversion program that serves as an alternativeto felony prosecutionfor
first-time, low-level welfare fraud defendants in San Diego County.
Key words: welfare fraud, welfare reform, poverty knowledge,
gender inequality, social policy, legal reform

In the aftermath of the passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,
it has become more important than ever for those concerned
with social and economic justice to pay attention to the experiences of those who have been affected by welfare reform.
Although governmental officials commonly assert that welfare
reform is successful, those of us who have observed this law
in action know that such an assertion is based on a narrow understanding of success, defined solely in terms of a reduction
of the number of people on welfare rolls. This conceptualization disregards the painful byproducts of the policy change.
Indeed, the touted reduction in the number of welfare recipients has not led to a marked improvement in most recipients'
lives; rather, its work requirements, time limits, and lack of
support for job training and education that would have provided recipients with avenues for self sufficiency have instead
exacerbated their financial hardships (Neubeck, 2006).
Our collective experience working in various capacities
with low-income women impacted by welfare reform has
allowed us to learn from their stories in order to distinguish
the real impacts of these policies on their lives. Central to
our work is that we have observed the increased demonization and criminalization of low-income women who have difficulty supporting their families on aid-consequences that
directly correspond with ramped-up efforts to detect welfare
fraud among "welfare queens" assumed to be out to cheat the
system.
In this article, we will consider the realities of women caught
in the web of welfare fraud prosecution after the 1996 changes
to welfare law. Specifically, we will examine the reasons why
women on public assistance have (knowingly or unknowingly) engaged in welfare fraud-fraud that occurred in most
cases when they received some form of income that was not
figured into the government calculation that determined the
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amount of their aid. Taking legal action against poor parents on
welfare became common beginning in the 1970s when grants
were made available for prosecuting welfare fraud. This situation has been amplified post-1996 because of welfare reform's
mandate that parents fulfill 32-hour per week work requirements, resulting in an increased number of women forced to
work in largely minimum wage jobs that make it difficult to
support their families. And yet, the experiences of these women
have, for the most part, been unexamined.
In her book, Poverty Knowledge (2001), Alice O'Connor explains that a new type of knowledge about poverty is needed,
one that is "grounded in practice, in activism, and in the experience not only of material deprivation but of the everyday
workings of the economy" (p. 293). This type of knowledge
is necessary to counter the large body of existing research
that perpetuates flawed assumptions about poverty and to
inform public policy. In this article, we explore a new "poverty
knowledge" that policymakers have generally disregardedhow women experience welfare-to-work policy and complex
income reporting rules, and how those experiences are related
to welfare fraud. Importantly, we also show how this knowledge inspired the design of a welfare fraud diversion program
that, since 2007, has served as an alternative to felony prosecution of first-time, low-level welfare fraud defendants in San
Diego.
The development of San Diego County's Welfare Fraud
Diversion Program is notable because historically public policies, and welfare policies in particular, have been constructed
with little consideration of how they will affect low-income
women and women of color (Abramovitz, 1998; Gatta, 2005;
Neubeck, 2006). Similarly, criminal justice policies and laws
traditionally have been constructed to disregard and marginalize the poor, women, and people of color (Cole, 1999; Miller,
1998). Thus, the creation of a fraud diversion program that has
at its base an acknowledgement of the structural factors poor
women are up against in the post-PROWRA era is an important policy change. It is our hope that the program will prove to
be important in allowing women entangled in the legal system
the possibility of future economic stability. Such an aim reflects
the ostensible goal of welfare reform for self-sufficiency that
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cannot be achieved in a system in which poor parents deemed
guilty of even first-time, low-level welfare fraud receive felony
and misdemeanor convictions that mean that they are essentially banned from future gainful employment.
The Sociohistorical Context of
Welfare Fraud Prosecution
Historically, negative stereotypes about welfare recipients
have spawned numerous efforts to increase social control and
criminalization of single mothers in poverty. Welfare fraud investigation and prosecution have included the infamous "man
in the house" midnight or early morning raids to see if men
were residing in the households of single welfare mothers, as
well as measures such as "wage matching" in which states had
access to welfare parents' income data to detect fraud (Gilliom,
2001, pp. 30-32).
Project 100%, implemented in San Diego County in 1997,
perhaps as a way of reducing the number of new cases in
anticipation of caseload reductions that would be required
under welfare reform, exemplifies the increased attention to
welfare fraud prevention, detection, and prosecution. Under
this program, every application in which eligibility has been
verified is referred to a welfare fraud investigator for an unannounced visit to the parent's home. The "visit" may involve a
simple "walk-through" or searches of closets, drawers, medicine cabinets, refrigerators, purses, and mail. Applicants can
refuse to have their homes searched, but if they do, they will
not be eligible to receive aid. Discovery in the case brought
against San Diego to contest the use of these search procedures revealed that while there was no effect on prosecutions
of fraud as a result of Project 100%, the program substantially
interfered with the ability to complete a successful application
(Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 [9th Cir. 20061 rehearing denied by, rehearing, en banc, Sanchez v. County of San
Diego, 483 F. 3d 965 (2007) cert. denied by Sanchez v. County of
San Diego, 128 S. Ct. 649 [2007]).
By 2003, the shifting of welfare fraud investigators into
the District Attorney's Office was a significant step that
further criminalized welfare parents, as all fraud queries by
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caseworkers would immediately be tied to the criminal process
without any preliminary inquiries as to non-criminal reasons
that might explain the client's conduct. Welfare fraud detection was now transformed into a fully pre-prosecutorial function whose costs had to be justified on the basis of presumed,
but unsubstantiated, savings due to fraud detection. And, as
a consequence, many women on welfare became secondary
victims of these changes.
Welfare Fraud in the Aftermath of PRWORA
In the aftermath of the passage of PRWORA, the mainstream media have given only sporadic attention to the subject
of welfare fraud, typically by focusing upon alleged cases of
fraud and by decontextualizing the events that led to charges
of fraud by prosecutors or welfare investigators (Wright, 1998).
Such biased distortions of the reality of welfare fraud have,
in ways that are similar to what Chunn and Gavigan (2004)
found in Canada, facilitated a generalized distaste for welfare
recipients and an increased interest in the social control of
the poor as, "welfare fraud became welfare as fraud" (p. 3).
With the passage of PRWORA, welfare parents now have increased scrutiny from child care workers, eligibility technicians, welfare-to-work supervisors, and employment case
managers as well as welfare fraud investigators, each of whom
may make separate judgments about whether or not parents
are adhering to the rules. Such heightened scrutiny and interest in social control of the poor indirectly serves the functions
of welfare reform to reduce the size of welfare caseloads. As
Mulzer (2005) argues,
... mistrustful of welfare claimants and convinced of

their ability to "scam" the system, many politicians
and members of the public wish to make benefits so
hard to obtain that only the truly desperate would
choose to apply. An emphasis on fraud may also have
an expressive function, increasing hostility towards
welfare and welfare claimants. In this way, stories about
fraudulent claims may be used to justify the stringent
verification procedures used for informal rationing or
to pave the way for outright cuts in eligibility. (p. 125)
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Although surprisingly little scholarly research on welfare
fraud post-PRWORA exists, and some of what there is reflects
mainstream myths (e.g., Luna, 1997),1 most scholars challenge
stereotypes about welfare fraud defendants as manipulative,
lazy women of color who dedicate their lives to bilking the
system (see Neubeck, 2006; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001; Roff,
Klemmack, McCallum, & Conaway, 2001). Studies published in
the eleven-year period since welfare reform was enacted largely
demonstrate that the majority of welfare recipients continue
to be low-income women who are working hard to survive
in a globalized capitalist economy (Johnson, 2000; Thomson,
2002). In the midst of this struggle, women have been found
to break the welfare rules in order to support themselves and
their children, sometimes knowingly and sometimes unwittingly because they are confused by the rules (Edin & Lein,
1997; Gilliom, 2005; Gustafson, 2005; Thomson, 2002; Wright,
1998).
Yet, acting on the assumption that welfare parents want
to cheat the system, they have been subjected to silencing,
humiliation, and unlawful treatment as state agents attempt
to detect fraudulent activities (Kennedy, 1998; Murray, 2000;
Roberts, 2005). Courts at both the federal and state levels have
upheld the use of home visits and walk-throughs of welfare
applicants' and welfare recipients' homes for verification purposes, in spite of the form of surveillance inherent in those acts
(Harvard Law Association, 2007). Such efforts to detect welfare
fraud have led to concerns about privacy and the legal rights of
low-income individuals (see Kennedy, 1998; Oren, 1996). And,
in the midst of their increased surveillance, women themselves
have resisted these infringements upon their dignity in large
and small ways (Gilliom, 2005; Roberts, 2005). Nonetheless,
lawmakers and government workers often disregard the experiences of women accused of welfare fraud. Social scientists, as
well, have paid insufficient attention to the causes of welfare
fraud and how it can be prevented.
In what follows, we describe the efforts of The Supportive
Parents Information Network (SPIN), a non-profit advocacy
organization working on behalf of low-income and welfare
families, and the San Diego Public Defender's Office, to systematically study the experiences of former welfare fraud
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defendants in order to discover why welfare fraud occurs and
to help develop a program that addresses its negative effects.
Project Background: Putting Two and Two Together
The Supportive Parents Information Network (SPIN) is a
grassroots organization that encourages low-income families
and those on welfare to identify and respond to economic
and social barriers to self-sufficiency. Located in San Diego,
California, SPIN has grown from 12 parents who began meeting
in their living rooms in 1998 to more than 3,500 parents and
nearly 5,000 children who have received services from the organization. SPIN's activities, carried out throughout the county
and state, center on peer support and advocacy, community
leadership, and involvement in civic decision-making. Central
to SPIN's mission is strengthening the participation of lowincome families in the economic and social well-being of their
families, neighborhoods, and communities. It is recognized as
the only local organization that consistently encourages participation by low-income families in public testimony and debate,
dialogue with public officials and legislators, coalitions across
economic, race, and gender lines, public demonstrations, individual legal advocacy, and public interest lawsuits.
SPIN's work begins when dozens of low-income and
welfare parents pass through its doors each week seeking help
in overcoming personal, economic, and legal barriers to selfsufficiency. Over the years of listening to their stories, SPIN
staff learned that people come because they want to work and
get off of welfare but have had difficulty getting hired at even
entry-level jobs or are unable to go from temporary work to
permanent employment. Others, who are becoming homeless
because landlords would not rent to them, come looking for
answers to their housing problems. As SPIN staff probed more
deeply into their circumstances, one theme appeared all too
frequently: Many of these parents cannot pass the background
checks that employers, landlords, and creditors increasingly
use to screen applicants. And significantly, many have been
excluded from these opportunities because records of welfare
fraud charges appeared on their credit reports and other
screening devices. This was often the case, even years after
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restitution had been made.
As noted above, welfare fraud most often results when families on public assistance receive income that was not figured
into the government calculation that determines how much
aid they should receive. What SPIN staff learned in listening
to these parents' stories is that welfare fraud is about much
more than intentionally lying to the government about income.
Parents often had felony records for welfare fraud because they
or welfare workers misunderstood or had difficulty following
the hundreds of resource and income reporting rules. As we
will demonstrate, sometimes the reasons they failed to report
income were completely out of their control, such as when husbands or boyfriends hid their income from the accused parent
or refused to allow her to report it. Moreover, under welfare
reform, parents who receive public assistance must work,
train, or engage in other activities that prepare them for employment, but they are often only able to secure unstable jobs
with fluctuating incomes. With incomes that are often difficult
to anticipate, reporting problems resulting from calculations
that lag behind actual allocations may lead to overpayment
and charges of welfare fraud in subsequent months.
To assist parents caught in these circumstances, SPIN staff
appealed to an ally in the Public Defender's Office. Yet, they
found that legal advocates for the poor were also hampered
by a slow-moving, inflexible legal system that allowed few
options other than a felony conviction, or, in the best case, if
the defendant was able to pay back most of the overpayment
over a period of time, plea bargains that resulted in misdemeanors.2 The public defenders explained that the problem
extends to, and is compounded by, gender inequities in the
system. Fathers who fail to pay child support, and thereby fail
to assist their children, are charged with a civil offense. But,
mothers who receive overpayments from the welfare system
while actively trying to support the children in their care are
charged with felonies, treated as criminals, and, on occasion,
even jailed. The elimination of what used to be criminal penalties for non-support by fathers involved an acknowledgement
that parents with a criminal record often cannot fulfill their financial responsibilities to their children. Yet, the legal system
persists in prosecuting mothers who are struggling with
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day-to-day care of children and increased work requirements
under welfare reform.
SPIN and the Public Defender's Office decided to team up
to create an alternative way of seeking redress in these cases.
The program, called Welfare Fraud Diversion, is a collaborative effort between researchers, the Public Defender's Office,
the District Attorney, and SPIN that seeks to minimize the debilitating effects of fraud cases on both accused parents and
the community. In order to establish the program, SPIN and
the Public Defender's Office sought the assistance of members
of our team as scholars of poverty, welfare, and criminal and
restorative justice to conduct research and design a more just
program to respond to the debilitating punishments associated
with first-time, low-level fraud offenses.
The Untold Story of Welfare Fraud
In order to develop a plan for a welfare fraud diversion
program that was based upon the realities of welfare reform
and the experiences of people who became involved in welfare
fraud, we conducted a content analysis of a random sample of
the Public Defender's welfare fraud case files for the year 2001
that yielded both quantitative and qualitative data. We later
conducted a qualitative follow-up study of welfare fraud case
files from the year 2005 to determine if changes in fraud patterns had occurred since the first study was conducted.
The quantitative findings of our initial study reveal that,
consistent with the characteristics of San Diego County's
welfare caseload, most of those convicted of fraud were women
of color whose average age was 35.5 years. About half of them
had a high school degree or less, only 17% had vocational
training, and none of them had a college degree. They had, on
average, two children, and they all received little to no child
support. 3 This meant that they were struggling to support their
children on an average monthly income of $565.
Most fraud convictions were for unreported income with
a median amount of $2,423, which on average, amounted to
only $164 per month per household member.4 This represented
part-time earnings of less than five-months' duration that were
scattered over a year or more, suggesting that parents made
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repeated attempts to plug gaps in inadequate subsistence
budgets. For the majority, the fraud conviction was their first
offense, and the mean amount of the overpayment was less
than $5,000. With 64% receiving no child support, the median
income from earnings and other sources-aid plus overpayment-was $1,113 per month. To place this figure in perspective, if defendants had reported all of their income, 73% still
would have incomes far enough below the poverty line to continue to qualify for welfare.
In both the 2001 and 2005 studies, qualitative data based
on findings of fraud investigators, parole officers, public defenders, and the affidavits submitted by defendants reveal
circumstances leading to fraud convictions that mirror the
experiences of women who had come to SPIN to seek assistance in dealing with the consequences of fraud convictions.
In some cases, interpersonal violence or external control over
recipients' lives by significant others is involved in a recipient's fraudulent behavior. Toni, who had taken her children to
stay with her mother at night while she worked because her
husband had been harassing her, was convicted of fraud on the
allegation that her children were not living with her. The father
of Gloria's children hid his earnings from her and gave false
pay receipts to file with the monthly earnings reports to the
welfare department. Other women who had no access to their
husbands' or boyfriends' income were threatened with assault
if they reported it. The following probation officer's case notes
describe the situation of a woman with $17,000 of unreported
income over a four-year period that resulted in a felony conviction. The unreported income came from the earnings of a
live-in boyfriend who did not share his money or pay stubs
and threatened her with abuse if she reported his income.
... the defendant was very frightened and anxious. She
alleged that the co-defendant did not share money with
her. He reportedly said, "You don't get shit, fucking
bitch." She did not challenge him because [she said] she
was "dumb and kind." The fraud continued out of her
fear that she alone could not provide for her children.
The defendant said that she feels "ashamed" for what
has happened.
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Notwithstanding such circumstances, 45% of the cases reviewed in the 2001 study resulted in felony convictions and
29% in misdemeanors. Approximately 19% of the cases were
thrown out due to errors on the part of welfare workers. Many
women whose cases were not dismissed also cited worker
error as central to their experiences as welfare fraud defendants. For example, Catherine, whose husband was temporarily employed while living separately from her and her family
for two months, failed to report his income because she was
unaware that he was working. Upon finding out about what
he was doing, she told her case worker about her situation and
was given incorrect information about how to proceed, which
ultimately led her to be prosecuted for welfare fraud. Similarly,
Raquel gave her paycheck stubs to her caseworker's receptionist, but they were misplaced, and she was convicted of fraudulent behavior for failing to report her income.
In contrast to popular assumptions, the case files reveal
that most committed fraud unknowingly or out of desperation. In a number of cases, they did not understand or had been
misinformed by caseworkers about their income and resource
reporting rules. They may have worked or received money
from a working husband or boyfriend because their cash aid
was not sufficient to support themselves and their families.
But because they could not provide for themselves and their
families on income from welfare and low-paying or temporary
jobs, they were "doing what they had to do," not for money to
buy luxuries, but to ensure the survival of their children. This
woman's words exemplify the experiences of many:
... I was only getting $645 per month, and my rent was

$439. I did not have much to live on, and I was told that
if I reported it, my welfare check was going to be cut
dramatically. ... I am a single mother trying to make it. I

know that lying about the money was wrong, but at the
time, it seemed that I didn't have much choice.
The difference between the cost of rent and this family's
cash aid left $206 to cover the costs of household supplies,
clothing, transportation, gas, electric, and telephone for a
working mother with children.
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Consistent with the findings of Edin and Lein's Making
Ends Meet (1997), parents like Yolanda failed to report income
because they did not have enough money to provide for their
families, "I did not report because I did not have enough money
to pay the rent, children's expenses, and my ill mother's expenses.. .it was a lot what I paid, and I did not have enough
money. That is why I did it." Gisela made a similar decision
not to report income. She needed money to pay her deceased
father's debts and son's legal expenses, but once those debts
were paid, she contacted her worker about the income that
she had not reported as a means of dealing with otherwise unmanageable debt. Thus, our findings reveal that women seek
additional work or remuneration to enable family survival
and may fail to report it out of fear that they may be unable
to support their families should the additional income result
in either losing their welfare benefits or having their cash aid
reduced.
Women also fear losing access to health care under
Medicaid because most of their employers, and the low-wage
labor market generally, are unlikely to provide health benefits
for them or their family members. Most, however, recognized
that their extra income was temporary, at best, and thus would
generate resources for only a very short period of time. In
one case, Alicia had secured a series of temporary jobs, and
because she was fearful of becoming indigent if her aid were
cut and she lost one of them, she did not report the income. In
another case, Janet misunderstood the reporting requirements
for temporary employment and thus failed to follow the rules.
Several women who received no child support, but secured
temporary employment, hoped that this employment would
provide a possible avenue out of welfare.
Often, women did not have a solid understanding of their
rights or legal procedures. And even when they felt they were
innocent, taking their case to trial risked conviction, not only
for fraud but also for perjury, a much more serious offense. In
such circumstances, plea agreements were routinely encouraged by public defenders. Traumatized by accusations of fraud
and perjury and the consequences of conviction, plea agreements were taken as the only viable option, even by defendants
who felt strongly that they were innocent. Only very rarely did
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cases go to trial.
As part of the plea agreements, convicted parents had to
repay the fraud amount and, in most cases, perform community service. But the costs to both the court and the parents do not
end here. With cases lasting on average 16 months, in nearly
all cases, the costs of investigation, apprehension, prosecution, and defense, as well as oversight of probation and collection efforts, are considerably larger than restitution amounts.
Moreover, restitution, combined with court costs, places
further financial burdens on already struggling families. But
even worse, welfare fraud convictions remain on their records.
With the background checks often required for even low-wage
jobs and in order to secure housing, these felony convictions
severely limit access to employment and housing and increase
the chances of continued dependence on the welfare system.
Policy Application: Imagining a More Just
Alternative to Fraud Prosecution
The results of our studies of welfare fraud cases confirmed
what many of us had already suspected based on the experiences of parents coming to SPIN and the Public Defender's
Office for help-that women often commit fraud unknowingly, and when they do commit fraud intentionally, it is because
they simply cannot make ends meet. Acknowledging this difficulty and in consultation with the various stakeholders, we
conceptualized a welfare fraud diversion program with several
components. First, prosecution would be diverted for firsttime offenders while they worked to repay the fraud amount.
Second, participants would attend a series of short workshops
to help welfare recipients better understand the rules for reporting income, the capacity of the welfare system to effectively account for income from temporary and intermittent work,
and to help them strategize ways to avoid fraud charges in
the future. In addition, one workshop would be dedicated to
financial literacy and to navigating successfully through the
world of check cashing and asset conservation. Third, there
would be a support system created to provide parents who
have entered diversion access to an advocate who would help
them continue to meet the requirements of diversion and to
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contend with their daily challenges. Ideally, this program
would include mentoring by former welfare fraud defendants
and a peer support network.
Successful completion of the program would result in
dismissal of the case, and importantly, leave people with no
welfare fraud charges or convictions on their records. The
Welfare Fraud Diversion Program would allow women the
same chance for a financially stable future that is given legally
to men who have failed to provide child support. This opportunity is only ethically just, given that the plight of many
low-income women is directly connected to this lack of child
support and a need to keep their families afloat. The Diversion
Program would also be a cost-effective approach to addressing welfare fraud, consistent with the self-sufficiency goals of
welfare reform.
In order to achieve the adoption of the Welfare Fraud
Diversion Program, the District Attorney for San Diego County,
as well as judges who heard welfare fraud cases, had to approve
the program. After months of negotiation between the Public
Defender's Office, the District Attorney's Office, SPIN, and
community members, a form of welfare fraud diversion was
put into place in San Diego County in late 2007. As implemented, the program will allow individuals accused of misdemeanor and felony welfare fraud to enter a guilty plea and work to
repay the money that they owe over a period of three years.
Fraud amounts of less than $5,000 are automatically charged
as misdemeanors, whereas previously, they were charged as
felonies. If the diversion participants pay a third of their restitution per year, follow the rules of the program, and fulfill
their community service hours (i.e., a 40-hour requirement for
misdemeanor defendants and an 80-hour requirement for
felony defendants over the three-year period), they will successfully complete the program. Upon completion, participants can petition the court to remove their guilty pleas and all
5
charges against them will be dropped.
As noted above, our original vision included educational
and support components that we thought would enhance the
ability for participants to successfully complete the diversion
program. However, a concern with overburdening welfare
fraud defendants with too many requirements, as well as the
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lack of funding, resulted in the District Attorney's decision to
implement a welfare fraud diversion program that does not
include all of the elements that our team had envisioned. The
omission of the education and support components of the diversion program is unfortunate because, as research has demonstrated (see Gatta, 2005; Neubeck, 2006), welfare policies
force women to take low-paying jobs, and PRWORA programs
do little to assist recipients in getting the skills needed to get
better paying positions. Once they are accused of welfare fraud,
low income women are even more disadvantaged, because
they are trapped in a place where restrictive welfare policies
intersect with punitive criminal justice policies, and they are
all the more in need of specialized information and assistance
to help them navigate through their predicaments. A peer
support network that is tied to the diversion process is needed
to harness the poverty knowledge that women who have been
through the system possess and to utilize it to empower others.
Instead, the current program requires the completion of a significant number of community service hours, which does not
help participants improve their economic situations and serves
primarily as a form of punishment.
While falling short of our ultimate goals, the diversion
program that has been developed is nonetheless one of the few
fraud diversion programs in the country and, as such, plays
an important role in creating a just alternative to the prosecution of low-level welfare fraud offenses. Moreover, the Welfare
Fraud Diversion Program that is now being employed in San
Diego County has the potential to enable welfare fraud defendants to get back on their feet and avoid the stigma of a criminal record. As of January 2008, 39 parents have become part of
the Diversion Program. Our research team plans to evaluate
the Welfare Fraud Diversion Program in the summer of 2008
and to provide feedback about the construction of the current
program based upon the experiences of women going through
it. We remain hopeful that as the body of poverty knowledge
based on the actual (not imagined) experiences of women
facing welfare fraud charges deepens, the elements of support
that we had originally envisioned will be incorporated into the
program.
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Conclusion
Welfare reform has widened the net of social control over
low-income families, and in the post-PRWORA era, our studies
reveal that welfare fraud is chiefly related to survival, confusion over complicated reporting procedures, or errors on the
part of welfare officials. Yet, welfare policy, the agencies that
administer its rules, and welfare law designed to adjudicate its
violators are predicated on assumptions that cast the poor as
undeserving of assistance and worse, as criminals. And, indeed,
the parents in our study have broken the rules. But, welfare
fraud convictions that carry fines, requirements for community service, jail sentences, and felony records create additional
burdens that make the immediate survival of the poor more
difficult and jeopardize their future ability to provide for their
families. With little attention given to this group of women
and the conditions that lead to fraud, even among scholars of
poverty and advocates for the poor, fraud convictions simply
reinforce these false assumptions; they demonstrate that the
poor are truly bad seeds, that we are doing something to weed
them out, and that we are holding them up as a warning to
others. The result, however, is to further marginalize this group
of poor parents and to provide further justification for the punitive policies and practices that contribute to fraud in the first
place. Largely demonized and forgotten by the public, policymakers, and scholars alike, those deemed guilty of welfare
fraud are the silent casualties of contemporary welfare policy.
Welfare fraud can only be reduced by acknowledging
the varied factors behind the act and setting aside stereotypes about the welfare poor. The experiences that we have
recounted paint a picture of welfare fraud grounded in the
conditions of women dealing with poverty amid complicated
welfare rules while attempting to support their families on subsistence wages that provide no way out of poverty. Progress
toward a more just disposition of welfare fraud cases requires
that advocates, armed with parents' actual experiences, continue to push an agenda that ends the nearly unquestioned
demonization of this group of poor parents and that furthers a
more just disposition of welfare fraud cases. Without research
to interrogate and challenge popular assumptions about

The Untold Story of Welfare Fraud

149

welfare reform, we are, if only unwittingly, complicit in sustaining iconic assumptions that cast all poor parents on welfare
as cheats who would rather take advantage of the system than
work to support themselves-the very assumptions that underlie welfare reform's punitive response to the problems of
the nation's poorest families.
The Welfare Fraud Diversion program in San Diego County
has not yet accomplished all of its goals. It is an ongoing struggle to overcome the limitations of funding and to entirely break
free of the imperatives of the legal system to punish those who
have broken society's laws. Yet, the program has achieved a
crucial breakthrough in its ability to use the poverty knowledge of welfare parents to make way for a more just dispensation of these cases. And, by drawing on the voices of women
to minimize the negative effects of welfare fraud, the program
offers a new model for crafting policy that transcends stereotypes to place the conditions of their lives and the needs of the
poor at its center.
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(Endnotes)
1) Luna's (1997) article, "Welfare Fraud and the Fourth
Amendment" is an example of one that perpetuates the myth
that the majority of welfare fraud is committed intentionally by
people with plenty of means to survive without public assistance.
Taken from sensationalized accounts appearing in newspapers, he
highlights atypical examples as though they are typical and states,
"These are the many faces of welfare fraud. They are sometimes
arrogant, other times pitiful, but always criminal" (p. 1239).
2) The actual "best case," from the point of view of public defense
attorneys, is a dismissal which is obtained only after extensive
investigation. This is not typically undertaken unless a parent
makes a clear-cut decision to go to trial, which is difficult for poor
parents who are told they need to work rather than prepare for and
attend multiple legal hearings. It may even be inadvisable given the
climate of public opinion concerning welfare parents.
3) The amount of child support ranged from $0 to $380, with a
median amount of $0 per month and an average amount of $40.45,
with 64% receiving no child support. The average amount is
affected by the fact that when a parent pays child support, but does
so at a level that is less than the welfare income eligibility threshold,
the child support goes to the County, and a parent gets a "pass
through" amount of only $50 per month. The rest goes to reimburse
counties for what they paid in welfare. So, the study results reveal
that 64% receive no child support, and the rest receive the $50 pass
through, an amount that is far less than what is necessary to cover
the costs associated with caring for even one child.
4) These amounts are based on minimum wages applicable during
the study period and account for both food stamps and cash aid.
5) If a parent can repay the full amount before a preliminary court
proceeding, charges are dismissed completely. Sometimes family
members come together to provide such a loan.

